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Drawing on the disconnect that currently exists between the social expectations associated 
with the corporate governance role of institutions and the institutions’ private interests, this 
article suggests that the current English legal framework does not adequately promote an 
optimal corporate governance role for institutions and does not meet the public interest of 
safeguarding investors’ long-term saving needs and sustaining a sound wealth-creating 
corporate sector in the long term. Our starting point is that investor-led governance, as this 
is aspired by UK policy-makers, is not only a matter of achieving beneficiaries’ private 
investment objectives through maximising long-term shareholder-value, but a matter of 
public interest. Next, we argue that existing regimes of private law that govern this area – 
first, the fabric of largely private law in contract and trust that governs the investment funds’ 
relationships with their beneficiaries, and, secondly, the company law and corporate 
governance norms that govern investment funds’ shareholder role – do not adequately take 
into account the public interest and, increasingly, are unable to meet the needs of private 
interests too. These inadequacies have only led to reinforcing a governance deficit for 
institutional shareholder behaviour and have left the dubious quality of institutions’ 
behaviour to market forces. We suggest that institutions’ shareholder behaviour should be 
governed in securities and investment management regulation and we outline the broad 
contours of how this may be achieved.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Institutional investment, as a means to manage the savings of many, has grown to become a 
global socio-economic phenomenon over the last five decades. With state retreat from 
welfarism,1 private savings and investment rose to become the key means for managing 
economic life and financial needs. The rise of pension fund management for retirement 
savings is arguably the key contributing factor to the phenomenon of saving through 
privately-managed investment, both in the UK and globally.2 As of 2015, the UK Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) estimates that there are 14.2 million pension savers in the UK, and 
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11 million retail investors.3 The FCA estimates that almost £6.6 trillion worth of assets are 
managed by UK-based investment fund managers.4 The size of the investment market is only 
one indication of the significant socio-economic footprint of investment management in 
ordinary economic life. At a micro level, the long-term success of savers’ needs depends on 
the exercise of investment management discretion by fund managers. The implications of this 
realisation are also profound at a macro level as investment management discretion becomes 
a fundamental building block of an investment economy and performs the essential 
intermediation of savers’ resources to long-term wealth creation purposes undertaken by the 
corporate, property or infrastructure sectors.5 This important intermediation role connects 
savers (the suppliers of capital) with economic ‘incubators’ or ‘time machines’, as Stout calls 
long-term wealth creating entities such as companies,6 (the demand side for such capital).  
It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that institutional shareholder behaviour in the 
UK has attracted policy attention since the 1990s through a series of soft-law measures built 
upon independent Committee Reports7 and the more recent Stewardship Code.8 In overall, 
the key narrative in UK policy making has been an endorsement of shareholder engagement 
bound up in the private agency-based corporate governance framework under which 
institutions are placed in a position to monitor corporate performance and to increase 
managerial accountability through active corporate equity investment. 9  Such active 
monitoring is perceived in the mainstream policy and academic circles as being able to 
improve corporate performance not only in the short- but also in the long-term.10 At the same 
time, investor-led corporate governance has been ushered in to improve financial returns for 
the ultimate beneficiaries of those assets of which institutions are trustees. Beyond this much 
hoped-for alignment between the corporate governance objective of shareholder-value 
increasing engagement on the one hand, and the accountability objective of improved returns 
for the ultimate beneficiaries on the other, it is increasingly perceived (especially following 
the global financial crisis of 2007-8) that institutional shareholders’ engagement in investee 
companies by managing the long-term financial interests of savers is key to ensuring that in 
the long-term savers’ needs and the corporate sector’s needs are both met in such a way that 
delivers overall social benefit.11 The underlying rationale for the official endorsement of 
                                                          
3 For statistics, see https://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/infographic-assets-under-management (all URLs 
were last accessed 20 September 2016). 
4 ibid. 
5 The rise of investment funds as economic allocators and their rise in power in the political economy is for, for 
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Wealth of Nations (Canada: Stoddart, 2001). 
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Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review) and the Kay Review 2012 (BIS, The Kay Review of UK Equity 
Markets and Long-Term Decision Making, Final Report, 23 July 2012). 
8  The UK Stewardship Code, Financial Reporting Council (2012), at 
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/e2db042e-120b-4e4e-bdc7-d540923533a6/UK-Stewardship-Code-
September-2012.aspx.  
9 Myners Report, n 7 above; Kay Review, n 7 above. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Kay Review, n 7 above. 
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investor-led governance in the UK is, in our view, tripartite: (i) attentiveness to the 
performance of investee companies over the long term on the basis of the private agency 
paradigm of corporate governance, (ii) commitment to the ultimate beneficiaries’ investment 
needs on the basis of the private trusteeship relationship that governs the investment funds’ 
relationships with their beneficiaries, and (iii) adherence to broader public regulatory 
objectives associated with the long-term savers’ needs. The importance of investment funds’ 
corporate governance roles is, therefore, not only a matter of achieving beneficiaries’ private 
investment objectives through maximising long-term shareholder-value, but a matter of 
public interest. 
Such investor-led governance relies, therefore, on the validity of at least two claims. First, 
it must be the case that investor-led governance can indeed improve the performance of 
investee companies in the long-term. Secondly, it must be the case that a strong performing 
corporate sector in the long term can offset the costs of active monitoring for investment 
managers and thereby better serve the interests of the institutions’ clients. Both claims have 
attracted an enormous amount of attention from scholars who are divided over the desirability 
of investor-led governance.12 The aim of this article is not to engage in these debates or make 
an assessment of the performance aspects of investor-led governance. Rather, our goal is to 
scrutinise the public interest aspect arising out of the corporate governance role of institutions 
as there is reason to believe that even if institutions conform to the policy aspirations of 
performing the monitoring function envisaged by the private agency corporate governance 
paradigm and serving the interests of their clients, they may jeopardise the investment hopes 
of the ultimate savers. This third facet underlying the official endorsement of investor-led 
governance in the UK imposes a rethinking of the nature of investor-led governance as 
reflecting socio-political dimensions of public interests. But such public interests are not in 
our view currently reflected in the private law governing the corporate governance role of 
institutions. We argue, therefore, that the public interest found in the corporate governance 
role of institutions can find more overt articulation in the development of regulatory duties 
under securities and investment regulation.   
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. In the first part, we outline the public interest 
aspects arising out of the corporate governance role of institutions and emphasise the 
practical challenges posed to such a role. We then argue in the second part of this article, that 
the private law of obligations in trust and contract that governs the relationships between the 
funds and their savers is increasingly unable to address those public interest concerns as they 
do not deal adequately with the collective nature of investment management, the growth of 
the investment chain and the public interest consequences of long-term investment. We then 
turn to the company law and corporate governance framework governing the expectations 
and behaviour of institutions as shareholders, and contend that the overall policy support for 
shareholder empowerment in the UK and the soft law of stewardship fails to adapt to the 
changing profile of shareholder as that of institutions and is overwhelmingly focused on 
                                                          
12 See, for example, P. L. Davies, ‘Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom’ in D. D. Prentice and P. R. J.  
Holland (eds.), Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 69-96. For a 
similar debate in the US, see B. Black, ‘Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice’, 
UCLA Law Review, 39 (1992), 811; J. C. Coffee Jr., ‘Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as 
Corporate Monitor’, Columbia Law Review, 91 (1991), 1277; R. J. Gilson and R. Kraakman, ‘Reinventing the 
Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors’, Stanford Law Review, 43 (1991), 863. 
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shareholders’ private interests disregarding wider public interests. As a result, investment 
management discretion, and its attendant principal-agent problems13 amplified by virtue of its 
socio-economic footprint, is an area riddled by governance deficits. To address these 
governance deficits, the article’s final part sets out a case for introducing regulation for 
institutional shareholders’ governance role. Although regulation is not always a panacea for 
governance deficits, we are of the view that meaningful aspects of securities regulation and 
investment management regulation can be extended to institutions’ corporate governance 
roles. We view the development of such a regime as a means of taming the corporate power 
of institutions, addressing the governance concerns associated with the exercise of 
contemporary forms of shareholder activism and serving the public interest associated with 
investor-led governance. Our proposed regulatory approach, despite being antithetical to the 
UK tradition of self-regulation in corporate governance, marries together the public-private 
paradigms, the common interests of investor protection and shareholder conduct, and it can 
be supported on public policy grounds of making investment management long-termism and 
accountable.  
 
I. The Public Interest Aspects of the Corporate Governance Role of Institutions: 
Expectations and Challenges 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s the proportion of UK equities owned by institutional investors 
increased dramatically and by the early 1990s, traditional institutional investors held the bulk 
of UK equities, with pension funds being the largest category, with almost a third.14 Despite 
the decline in the share of equities owned by UK pension funds in the years that followed, the 
overall institutional ownership of UK equities reached new heights in the 2000s because of 
the increase in overseas institutional investors.15 As owners of corporate equity, funds and 
their asset managers become shareholders of companies. Not only do they assume legal rights 
under company law, but institutional ownership of corporate equity has been an important 
driving factor for the adoption of the centricity of shareholder value as a corporate 
objective.16  
The shareholder primacy rhetoric in corporate law which began life in economic terms (as 
a result of the efficient organisation of the company),17 has increasingly become a political 
                                                          
13 A. M. Pacces, ‘Financial Intermediation in the Securities Markets Law and Economics of the Conduct of 
Business Regulation’ (2000) 20 International Review of Law and Economics 479. Modern investment 
management structures create unique principal-agent problems and lacunae in accountability that will be further 
canvassed in the article.  
14 For statistics between 1997 and 2012, see 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/search/index.
html?newquery=*&nscl=Shareholdings+by+Individuals&nscl-orig=Shareholdings+by+Individuals&content-
type=publicationContentTypes&sortDirection=DESCENDING&sortBy=pubdate 
15 ibid. 
16 E. Stockhammer, ‘Financialization and the Slowdown of Accumulation’ in I. Erturk, J. Froud, S. Johal, A. 
Leaver and K. Williams (eds), Financialization At Work: Key Tests and Commentary (London: Routledge, 
2008); P. Ireland, ‘The Financialization of Corporate Governance’ (2009) 60 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 
1. 
17  F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1948); J. Fisch, ‘Measuring Efficiency In Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy’ 
(2005) 31 Journal of Corporation Law 637. 
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phenomenon.18 Although the investment fund industry comprises of different types of funds 
whose mandates are heterogeneous, the embrace of shareholder centricity is advantageous to 
them,19 and we see a high-level convergence of shareholder behaviour around the common 
theme of the primacy of funds’ financial interests in their investment management. The main 
investment fund vehicles today can be classified into certain large clusters of equity-owning 
funds: pension funds, mutual funds/retail collective investment schemes (many of which are 
UCITs), alternative investment funds such as hedge and private equity funds and sovereign 
wealth funds.20 Although each cluster does not behave homogenously as equity-owners, one 
of us in another work 21  argues that at a high level, institutions orient their corporate 
governance roles towards their performance needs, usually in the short term, and very rarely 
are cognisant of broader, systemic and long-term implications. Pursuant to such an approach, 
funds may indeed adopt on the face of it, different types of corporate governance behaviour, 
ranging from passive ownership to active engagement or shareholder activism.22 However, 
the overall insularity of their approaches is disengaged from the wider concerns for savers 
and the long-term corporate economy, and is mainly driven by the institutions’ own profit 
maximisation.23 Hence, the examination of the institutions’ shareholder behaviour raises a 
range of different concerns when we remind ourselves of the social framing of their long-
term roles and the wider public interests associated with their corporate governance role. 
The dominant law-and-economics academic community of the last 25 years is of the view 
that institutional shareholders, especially after the re-concentration of public equity in their 
hands, are best able to keep management honest and focused on long-term corporate value 
maximisation.24 This view is based on the private agency paradigm of corporate governance 
which mainly deals with internal accountability primarily to shareholders/principals.25 Under 
this framework, shareholder monitoring can mitigate managerial/agent abuse and thereby 
benefit other constituents in the corporate governance framework, such as creditors and 
employees. Shareholders’ corporate governance roles are, therefore, seen as an integration of 
their private interests with the wider social/public interest in a well-performing corporate 
sector not riddled with scandals.  
                                                          
18 See H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2001) 89 Georgetown Law 
Journal 439; M. Gelter, ‘The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy’ (2013) 43 Seton Hall Law 
Review 910. In the UK, Armour and others argue that shareholder primacy is a powerful norm but somewhat 
mitigated by Europe’s pro-stakeholder agendas; see J. Armour, S. Deakin and S. Konzelmann, ‘Shareholder 
Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance’ (2003) 41 British Journal of Industrial Relations 531. 
19 In fact, a number of commentators have opined that institutions are powerful in shaping modern corporate 
governance norms in favour of shareholder centricity which is consistent with their preferences, see M. Siems, 
‘Convergence in Corporate Governance:  A Leximetric Approach’ (2010) 35 Journal of Corporation Law 729; 
C. Gerner-Beuerle, ‘Determinants of Corporate Governance Codes’ (2014), at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346673. 
20  * and **, Investment Management and Corporate Governance (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2017 
forthcoming). 
21 ibid. 
22 T. McNulty and D. Nordberg ‘Ownership, Activism and Engagement: Institutional Investors as Active 
Owners’ (2016) 24 Corporate Governance: An International Review 346. 
23 See also J. Hendry, P. Sanderson, R. Barker and J. Roberts ‘Responsible Ownership, Shareholder Value and 
the New Shareholder Activism‘ (2007) 11 Competition & Change 223 (qualitatively finding that the main 
driving force behind shareholder activism in the UK is the institutions’ own profit maximisation and the need to 
outperform competing institutions). 
24  See citations in fn 12. 
25 M. Jensen and W. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
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Of course, this view is not universally shared and it is often argued that shareholder 
incentives are incompatible with active engagement as a force for governance as the 
shareholders’ interests are at odds with long-term management in the interests of 
stakeholders.26 Preoccupied with one side of this debate policy makers in the UK have mainly 
looked at the corporate governance role of shareholders 27 emphasising the social benefits of 
more constructive shareholder engagement by institutions.   
The Myners Report in 200128 and the more recent Kay Review of 201229 aim to bolster 
investor-led governance on the premise that institutional shareholder engagement is part of 
good corporate governance for the public interest and not merely for the benefit of the 
institutions themselves. Also, the Walker Review30 considered investor-led governance as 
being relevant to monitoring management in UK banks and financial institutions. The 
mainstream view in UK policy circles (especially after the global financial crisis) is that 
shareholder monitoring does not only serve shareholder value maximisation and the private 
interests of asset managers’ clients but the there is a public interest in the discharge of the 
responsibilities of institutional shareholders as owners, an ‘implicit social legitimacy’, 31 
which found ultimate expression in the stewardship responsibilities introduced by the UK 
Stewardship Code.32 These wider benefits to the public can accrue as a result of a strong 
long-term performance of UK companies and the ability of ultimate beneficiaries (savers) to 
benefit from this performance through returns to indirect (but also direct) ownership of shares 
in UK companies.  
However, the UK securities market is marked by distinctive features that pose challenges 
to this vision of constructive investor-led governance for the public interest. The UK not only 
has a largely dispersed shareholding structure in its corporate economy but a globally 
competitive and highly liquid stock market.33 Although institutions (mainly foreign ones) are 
now the dominant shareholders in UK corporate equity,34  the UK shareholding structure 
remains largely dispersed with many institutions holding only small minority stakes. Berle 
and Means opined as early as in the 1930s that dispersed minority equity owners were likely 
                                                          
26 Discussed in D. Katelouzou ‘Reflections on the Nature of the Public Corporation in an Era of Shareholder 
Activism and Shareholder Stewardship’ in B. Choudhury and M. Petrin (eds.), Understanding the Modern 
Corporation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016 Forthcoming) (arguing for a shift towards an 
‘investor paradigm’ in corporate law which calls for both shareholder monitoring and shareholder responsibility, 
bringing together owner control and social accountability). 
27 But see Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, Corporate Governance Reform Green Paper, 
November 2016, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/573438/beis-16-56-corporate-
governance-reform-green-paper-final.pdf 
28 Myners Report, n 7 above. 
29 Kay Review, n 7 above. 
30 D Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities: Final 
Recommendations (26 November 2009).  
31 Ibid. 
32 See text to notes 124-44 below. 
33 See, generally, B. C. Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control: British Business Transformed (Oxford: 
OUP, 2008) 
34 This refers to both domestic and foreign institutions, with the latter outstripping the former in terms of 
ownership of UK corporate equity. See ONS, Holdings of UK Quoted Shares by Sector of Beneficial Owner 
(2015) at 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/bulletins/ownershipofukquotedshares/2015-09-
02. 
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to be passive investors who would likely take no sense of ownership of the wider 
implications of companies as wealth-creating institutions for the economy and society. 35 
Indeed, passivity and lack of engagement still characterises most UK institutional investors 
and asset managers who mainly focus on trading on the liquid securities markets in order to 
generate investment returns.36  
On the other side of the spectrum, encouraging institutions to engage for the public interest 
is not a panacea. Neville37 suggests that what is socially beneficial is a balanced and a ‘right 
type’ of shareholder engagement that concurrently achieves the institution’s private 
objectives aligned with socially beneficial objectives in the long term. But such an alignment 
is, in our view, a misplaced assumption, a hope. Unbridled shareholder activism, unleashed of 
any regulatory constraints, would primarily serve institutions’ private interests. For example, 
‘investor myopia’ on the part of institutions has already been observed by academics and 
policy-makers. 38  Evidently institutional investors’ obsession with short term investment 
performance is key to their investment management practice. 39 Thus, even where institutions 
support shareholder engagement, such engagement is on the basis of a shareholder value 
ideology 40  that exerts short-termist pressures upon their investee companies and has 
deleterious effects upon corporate culture, bringing in short-termism and less regard for 
stakeholders and wider social responsibility.  
Pursuant to shareholder demands, corporations are increasingly pressured to generate 
earnings in order to keep share prices up from quarter to quarter.41 Corporate short termism is 
defined as behaviour that is dedicated to short term strategies to keep earnings high whether 
or not such strategies result in value destruction for the company in the long-term. 42 
Corporate short termism, such as reducing employment expense and R&D investment in 
order to boost short-term earnings, obscures long-term thinking for the company and in due 
course could prove destructive for the long-term wealth creation role of the corporate 
economy. 43  Corporate short-termism may be regarded as a response to the demands of 
institutional shareholders, whose focus is on trading in generating investment returns and is 
contrary to and indeed damaging to the prospects of long-term saving through investing in 
corporate equity.44  Further, commentators45  find corporate short-termism to be related to 
greater indifference to stakeholder or corporate responsibility issues, and institutions lack 
                                                          
35  A. A. Berle and G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New Brunswick, US: 
Macmillan 1932), 66. 
36 Cheffins, n 33 above. 
37 M. Neville, ‘The Suspicious Shareholder’ in H. Birkmose, M. Neville and K. Engsig Sørensen (eds.), The 
European Financial Market in Transition  (Alpen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2011). 
38 Kay Review, n 8, above; C. Mayer, Firm Commitment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
39 See Aspen Institute, Overcoming Short-termism: A Call for a More Responsible Approach to Investment and 
Business Management (2009) at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/overcoming-short-termism-call-
more-responsible-approach-investment-business-management; C. Helms, M. Fox and R. Kenagy, ‘Corporate 
Short-Termism: Causes and Remedies’ (2012) 23 International and Comparative Company Law Review 45.  
40 See citations in fn 18. 
41 See, for example, P. E. Masouros, Corporate Law and Economic Stagnation: How Shareholder Value and 
Short-Termism Contribute to the Decline of the Western Economies (Eleven International Publishing 2013). 
42 See citations in fn 39. 
43 E. Duruigbo, ‘Tackling Shareholder Short-Termism and Managerial Myopia’ (2011-12) 100 Kentucky Law 
Journal 531. 
44 Kay Review, n 7, above. 
45 D. Millon, ‘Shareholder Social Responsibility’ (2012-13) 36 Seattle University Law Review 911; E. Duruigbo, 
‘Stimulating Long-term Shareholding’ (2011-12) 33 Cardozo Law Review 1734. 
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motivation to address social and environmental harms that the company is perpetuating. 
Moore and Walker-Arnott argue that such short-termist trading behaviour is ultimately 
socially harmful as it involves perpetual transfers of future wealth to the present to meet 
short-termist needs, and will ultimately undermine long-term investment performance and the 
long-term prospects and cost of capital of the corporate sector. 46  Such short-termist 
investment gains can be disengaged from real productivity gains and depart from the model 
of patient capital-investing in corporations.47 Pervasive short-termism is, therefore, a matter 
of wider public interest relating to the future of the corporate economy and the productivity 
of long-term savings invested in corporate equity. 
Finally, new movements in shareholder behaviour have also uttered a threat to the public 
interests associated with the corporate governance role of institutions. At the turn of 21st 
century, we saw a handful of hedge fund managers turning to corporate governance as an 
investment strategy and engaging – sometimes very aggressively – with firms where 
management is not capable of maximizing the value of the current assets.48 Such activism 
leverages upon existing shareholder rights in domestic company law frameworks throughout 
the world,49 and is supported by a shareholder primacy rhetoric. American scholars Iman 
Anabtawi and Lynn Stout warn of the informal but powerful influences minority activists can 
wield even if these are not strictly exercises of any legal power. 50  Such influences are 
particular powerful as institutional shareholder activism, and especially hedge fund activism, 
affects the securities markets acutely,51 and modern companies reliant on capital markets are 
tremendously sensitive to effects transmitted from the securities markets. Although 
shareholder activism does not relate to legal power over corporate property, 52  activist 
influence over management may not be understated. The effects of such shareholder activism 
are also not unequivocally optimal.53 There is a very vivid scholarly and public debate about 
                                                          
46 M. T. Moore and E. Walker-Arnott, ‘A Fresh Look at Stock Market Short Termism’ (2014) 41 Journal of 
Law and Society 416. 
47 D. T. Mitchell, ‘Institutional shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy’ (2006) 65 
Washington and Lee Law Review 4. 
48 I. H-Y Chiu, The Foundations and Anatomy of Shareholder Activism (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing, 2010), chapters 1 and 2; D. Katelouzou, ‘Myths and Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: Some 
Empirical Evidence’ (2013) 7 Virginia Business and Law Review 459. 
49  D. Katelouzou, ‘Worldwide Hedge Fund Activism’ Dimensions and Legal Determinants’ (2015) 17 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 789. 
50 I. Anabtawi and L. Stout, ‘Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders’ (2008) Stanford Law Review 1255. See 
also a somewhat dubious piece that argues that influential minority activists could amount to shadow directors 
and thus should be subject to the same fiduciary duties: D. W. Giattino, ‘Curbing Rent-Seeking by Activist 
Shareholders: The British Approach’ (2011) 25 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 103. 
51  Much empirical research has pointed out how activist stakes affect security prices from the time of 
announcing the stake, even before activism has begun, see A. Brav, W. Jiang, F. Partnoy and R. Thomas, 
‘Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance’ (2009) 63 The Journal of Finance 1729-
1775; M. Becht, J. Franks, J. Grant and H. F. Wagner (2015) ‘The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An 
International Study’, at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2376271. 
52 P. J. Dalley, ‘Shareholder (And Director) Fiduciary Duties and Shareholder Activism’ (2008) 8 Houston 
Business and Tax Law Journal 301, 302.  
53 See, among others, W. W. Bratton, ‘Hedge Funds and Governance Targets’ (2007) 95 Georgetown Law 
Journal 1375; W. W. Bratton and M. L. Wachter, ‘The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment’ (2010) 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 653; L. E. Strine, Jr., ‘One Fundamental Corporate Governance 
Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also 
Act and Think Long Term?’ (2010) Business Lawyer 1; Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, ‘Empiricism and 
Experience; Activism and Short-Termism; the Real World of Business’ (2013) at 
http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.22899.13.pdf; L. E. Strine, Jr., ‘Can We 
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the perceived ‘dark side’54 of hedge fund activism and over whether the effects of activist 
hedge fund campaigns are ‘real’55 — that is, whether activist hedge funds have a long-term 
effect on firm ‘fundamentals’ that lasts beyond the short-term market reaction or whether 
activist hedge fund interventions reflect unsustainable changes that will not translate into 
long-term improvement of the corporate performance. Even though no study has concluded 
that hedge fund activism destroys near-term shareholder value, 56  it is still questionable 
whether activist hedge funds can act ‘like real owners’,57 or as a ‘corrective mechanism’ in 
corporate governance.58 It is, therefore, doubtful whether hedge funds’ engagement practices 
can be cognizant of wider public interests in their corporate governance role. 59  Such a 
detachment becomes all the more significant as with the increase of activist hedge funds, 
institutional shareholder activism also took shape: mainstream institutional shareholders, such 
as pension funds, become increasingly willing to support activist hedge funds’ campaigns, 
but are unlikely themselves to initiate them.60 
There is, therefore, a disconnect between the social expectations associated with the 
corporate governance role of institutions and the institutions’ private interests, which raises 
important questions in terms of the dominance of institutions’ private interests, their mixed 
impact on investee companies, and the dubious quality of their active role in corporate 
governance. Despite the socio-economic ramifications of institutional shareholder roles in 
corporate governance, policy-makers in the UK have naively supported shareholder centricity 
and engagement and have not considered that unleashing active shareholder behaviour 
requires a balanced antithetical consideration in terms of their due governance.  
 
II.  The Increasing Inadequacies of Private Law to Address the Public Interest 
Aspects of Institutions’ Corporate Governance Roles 
 
Modern investment management is largely governed by a web of private law obligations in 
contract, trust and tort law.61 In a simple paradigm where an individual investor entrusts to a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Do Better By Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate 
Law’ (2014) Columbia Law Review 449;  
54 Katelouzou, n 48 above. 
55 A. Brav, W. Jiang and H. Kim, ‘The Real Effects of Hedge Fund Activism: Productivity, Asset Allocation, 
and Industry Concentration’ (2013), at http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/30891/AlonBrav.pdf. 
56 For a recent literature review on all major studies on whether (US and non-US) hedge fund activism creates 
value, see A. Brav, W. Jiang and H. Kim, ‘Recent advances in research on hedge fund activism: Value creation 
and identification’ (2015) 7 Annual Review of Financial Economics 579. 
57  M. Kahan and E. Rock, ‘Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control’ (2007) 115 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1021. 
58 P. Rose & B. Sharfman, ‘Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate Governance’ (2014) 
Brigham Young University Law Review 1015. 
59 D. Katelouzou ‘Hedge Fund Activism and Shareholder Stewardship: Incompatible, Reciprocal or Something 
in Between?’ Working Paper (in file with the authors). 
60  R. J. Gilson and J. N. Gordon, ‘The Agency Costs of agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the 
Reevaluation of Governance Rights’ (2013) Columbia Law Review 863. 
61  Major references in investment management law in the US and UK, the two largest investment fund 
management jurisdictions globally, deal with the bedrock of contractual terms, fiduciary obligations and duties 
of care and skill, supplemented to an extent by legislation in both jurisdictions. See, for example, T. Spangler, 
Investment Management Law (Oxford: OUP, 2008); L. van Setten, The Law of Institutional Investment 
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skilled  investment intermediary to manage her investment, such intermediary’s relationship 
with the investor is governed by the agency agreement whose contractual terms form the 
basis of investment objectives and the intermediary’s investment powers, as well as by 
standards of conduct in fiduciary and tort law. The relationship between the investor and 
intermediary, characterised by the investor’s reliance on the professional skill of the 
intermediary, and the intermediary’s powers to have custody of and deal with the investor’s 
money and assets, falls within the category of ‘fiduciary relationships’,62 which require the 
intermediary to act in a way that is loyal to the investor and not to harm her interests.63 This 
largely proscriptive standard is, however, not absolute and has evolved as a balancing act 
between investors’ interests and the intermediary’s commercial interests as discussed below. 
Further, as the intermediary is a skilled investment professional, it is held to a standard of 
care and skill that is reasonably expected of such profession.64 Overtime, the standard of care 
and skill has become more specifically articulated in regulatory duties in the UK and US, 
relating to prudence and portfolio diversification.65 
In this Section we argue that modern investment management governed by private law 
is increasingly irrelevant to the public interest aspects of institutions’ corporate governance 
roles. The private law paradigms might be sufficiently wide to encompass a range of 
investment management actions that institutions carry out, including outsourcing and 
assumption of corporate governance roles.66 However, we are of the view that the industry 
structures of institutional investment increasingly alienates institutions’ corporate governance 
roles from beneficiaries. This disengagement has profound implications for the nature of 
institutions’ corporate governance roles. We point to two key developments in the changing 
relational paradigm between investors and their investment intermediaries. The first 
development is the rise of collective investment management as the primary way to manage 
myriad savers’ capital. The pooling of savers’ capital into a collective entity that is managed 
by the investment intermediary results in the augmentation of intermediary power while 
marginalising each investor’s preferences. Second, the structure of investment management, 
which has developed into chains of specialist services, dilutes the extent of private law 
obligations owed to investors and investors’ recourse. The investment chain structure 
inevitably disengages and disempowers investors from monitoring and feeding their 
preferences into the investment management function. This results in institutions’ taking on 
corporate governance roles not as a reflection of the beneficiaries’ preferences, which could 
inculcate long-termism and the social interest in sustainable corporate wealth creation, but as 
a means to serve the institutions’ own investment performance interests which are not always 
aligned with the beneficiaries’ long-termist and socially minded interests. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Management (Oxford: OUP, 2009); D. Busch and D. Demott (eds), Liability of Asset Managers (Oxford; OUP, 
2012). 
62 See Spangler, ibid, at para 4.26-4.45; van Setten, ibid, at paras 3.60-3.69. 
63 The proscriptive nature is explained in Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 18. See 
discussion and citations in Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries (June 2014) at 
paras 3.12, 3.13. 
64 See distinction made between the duty of loyalty and care in Seymour v Christine Ockwell & Co & ors. (2005) 
PNLR 39, and general law applies in terms of professional standards of care, see Bolam v Friern Hospital 
Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
65 UNEP Finance Initiative, A Legal Framework for Integrating Environmental, Social and Governance Issues 
into Institutional Investment (2005) at 8. 
66 E. McGaughey, ‘Does Corporate Governance Exclude the Ultimate Investor?’ (2015) 16 Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 221. 
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The Rise of Collective Investment Management  
The first development pointing to the disconnection between ultimate beneficiaries and the 
institution’s corporate governance role is that investment management has increasingly 
become a collective investment management phenomenon. Collective pooling of savings into 
investment funds ensures sufficiently affordable access to investment due to economies of 
scale. Collective investment management creates access to investment for the ordinary saver 
in the street, but this gives rise to standardisation in the relational dimension between 
investment intermediaries and investors and therefore (ironically) less prospect for tailor-
made financial solutions to specific needs. The rise of the collective investment management 
phenomenon is widely supported in the face of the retreat of state welfarism in individual 
financial provision.67 Furthermore, in the latter part of the twentieth century, legal changes 
that weakened the application of the full extent of private law, such as in fiduciary duties, 
have taken place to further support the dominance of collective investment management. 
Collective investment management would, in the absence of legal and regulatory 
intervention, face severe limitations due to the application of fiduciary law. Fiduciary law 
ensures that the entrusted entity acts in loyalty towards the investor and is proscribed from 
acting against or being in a position of conflict with the investor’s interest. 68  The strict 
application of fiduciary law would make it difficult for collective investment management to 
be carried out as there may be conflicts of interest between investors. Further, such strict 
application would also make it impossible for fund managers to manage more than one fund 
as there may be conflicts of interest between funds, between managers and fund investors, 
and between investors.69  
Legal and regulatory inroads have persistently been made into the strict application of 
fiduciary law. By the early 1990s, it had become increasingly accepted in the UK that the 
intermediary nature of certain businesses could give rise to potential conflicts of interests.70 
The financial sector was nevertheless of the view that there was no prohibition of conflicts of 
interests, so avoiding them was not necessary.71 However, the uncertainty in the application 
of the general fiduciary principle to financial transactions would cause increased ‘legal risk’ 
that was inimical to the interests of the industry. As such, the industry lobbied to support 
limitations in private law remedies for clients in breach of contract, breach of fiduciary or 
statutory duties, or tort liability. 72  The English Law Commission, in its 1995 report, 
concluded that the general law on fiduciary duties had limited application to the financial 
sector.73 Qualifications in applying fiduciary duties to many commercial contexts had been 
developing in the UK case law.74 The Law Commission expressed the view that as there were 
nascent regulatory rules governing the conduct of financial intermediaries, these regulatory 
rules should be read as contractual usages modifying the nature and scope of any fiduciary 
                                                          
67 See, for example, G. L. Clark, Pension Fund Capitalism (Oxford: OUP, 2000). 
68 Van Setten, n 78 above at paras 3.60-3.63. 
69 The dimensions of conflicts of interest are discussed in G. Palazzo and L. Rethel, ‘Conflicts of Interest in 
Financial Intermediation’ (2008) 81 Journal of Business Ethics 193. 
70 For example, intermediaries acting for both sides of a transaction, examples are discussed in Law 
Commission, Fiduciary Duties and Regulatory Rules (Law Com CP No 124, 1995). 
71 See, for example, the Privy Council decision in Kelly v Cooper [1993] AC 205 (PC). 
72 J. J. Dalhuisen, Transnational and Comparative Commercial, Financial and Trade Law, vol III (5th edn, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012), chapter 2. 
73 See Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties and Regulatory Rules (Law Com CP No 124, 1995). 
74 ibid. 
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duty.75 The clarification provided by the Law Commission meant that financial institutions 
could contractually delineate the scope of their fiduciary liability vis-à-vis clients, within the 
scope of the regulatory principles, and that this would be accepted in courts as the substance 
and extent of any duty owed to clients.76 General fiduciary law is now of limited relevance to 
governing the management of conflicts of interest in financial firms. Hanrahan, writing in the 
Australian context, rightly points out that general fiduciary law is no longer able to provide 
the ‘public good’ of client protection with respect to regulating conflicts of interest.77 
Regulators have introduced a regulatory regime for conflicts of interest management for 
financial firms, both as a means of clarifying their safe scope of business, as well as to 
provide investor protection to some extent. However, the regulatory regime arguably 
manifests the unwillingness of policymakers to unduly restrain financial intermediary 
business.78 The approach adopted in the UK allows financial firms to identify, manage and 
disclose conflicts of interest,79 without being excessively prescriptive.  
In this paradigm of collective investment management, investors no longer buy into a 
relationship with their investment intermediaries. Rather, they buy into a product created by 
intermediaries, which is a distinct and usually incorporated entity that holds the pool of 
capital managed by the intermediary. The relational paradigm in contract and trust law which 
frames investors’ and intermediaries’ relationship as one of professional delegation and 
accountability is increasingly being eclipsed by the reality of intermediary domination in 
defining investors’ nature of participation. Investors are disempowered and disaggregated 
constituents of a collective investment vehicle that assumes its own identity in conducting 
corporate governance roles vis a vis investee companies. Investors become passive and likely 
lacking in concern with respect to the wider social purposes of investing for the long-term. 
This is not desirable as institutions may cease to reflect socially-minded purposefulness in 
their investment management, which explains the postures of short-termism and 
instrumentalism in their corporate governance roles discussed above.  
Even if in principle, private law paradigms do not prevent beneficiaries from instructing 
institutions to take certain corporate governance positions, 80  we query whether it is 
practicable or appropriate for one or several like-minded beneficiaries in the fund to influence 
the fund’s overall corporate governance position. The collectivisation of investment 
                                                          
75 But this would remain subject to judicial review, see ibid. 
76 Blanket exclusions are not allowed, see Brandeis (Brokers) Limited v Herbert Black, American Iron and 
Metal Company Incorporated, Lito Trade Incorporated, 2001 WL 513189. But see G. McCormack, ‘Conflicts 
of Interest and the Investment Management Function’ (1999) 2 Company Lawyer 2.   
77  P. F. Hanrahan, ‘Fiduciary Duty and the Market: Private Law and the Public Good’ (2008), at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1184443 (writing in the context of the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission’s failed action in fiduciary duty against Citigroup and arguing that the private law of fiduciary duty 
is increasingly likely to tolerate contractual modifications, especially in contracts between sophisticated 
investors).  
78 R. R. West, ‘Conflicts of Interest: Substance or Subterfuge?’ (1971) 27 Financial Analysts Journal 31. 
79 UK law comes from Art 23, Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 
2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU 
(recast), derived from European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/39/EC of 21 April 2004 on markets in 
financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC [2004] OJ L145/1 (Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive, MiFID), art 18. That said, there are specific regulatory rules for inducements, 
Art 24 of the MiFID 2014 Directive and for investment research. 
80 McGaughey, n 67 above. 
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management provides no incentives for any particular beneficiary to take such initiatives, a 
problem known as the collective action problem. Further, it may be arguably inconsistent 
with duties of care or fiduciary duty for the fund to be captured by a particular beneficiary’s 
initiative. Hence, the collectivisation of investment management via a pooled capital structure 
such as a fund not only distances investors from the practices of investment management 
including the fund’s corporate governance roles, but also creates a diffused and uncertain 
context for beneficiaries to express any particular preferences. This, in effect, leaves funds’ 
corporate governance positions to be determined by funds, not their savers, and in practice, it 
would be the fund manager that exercises such discretion, as will be discussed below.  
The Growth of the Investment Chain 
The second, related, development concerns the increasing complexity of investors’ 
relationships with their intermediaries, as manifested in the growth of the investment chain.81 
In the investment chain, funds are separated from fund management, and other specialist 
services that complement the fund management function such as trading, research, custody, 
depositary, prime brokerage etc.82 The investor’s relationship is with the fund, to which the 
private law obligations referred to earlier apply. However, there is no direct relationship 
between the investor and other service providers appointed by the fund. As the fund entity 
appoints the management company to invest and manage the fund assets, and other services 
in terms of brokerage, advice, custodial and other services, investors in a fund do not have a 
direct legal relationship with any of entities that manage or operate the fund on a day-to-day 
basis, chief of whom is the fund manager who is crucial for making strategic and operational 
decisions in relation to the investment management of the fund’s assets. Such a structure of 
‘separation of funds from management’ can be observed in pension funds, which outsource 
investment management to various portfolio managers,83 retail collective investment funds 
such as the popular UCITs, hedge and private equity funds. 
Despite any efficiency gains of the separation of fund from management, 84  such a 
structure is likely to be legally disadvantageous to investors, as the investor protection they 
enjoy under duties of care85 and relevant fiduciary law86 would only be owed by the fund 
entity and not the fund manager or other entities that the fund contracts with. For example, 
the UK Pensions Act 1995 imposes on pension trustees duties of care.87 Pension trustees 
often seek to delegate to professional investment management as discharge their duty of care. 
As long as the appointment of fund managers is not procedurally impeached, investors are 
                                                          
81 Kay Review, n 7 above, at chapter 6. 
82 For an account of why investors and find managers converge upon accepting this structure based on efficiency 
reasons, see J. Morley, ‘The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and 
Regulation’ (2013-14) 123 Yale Law Journal 1228. 
83 Whether in relation to defined benefit or contribution schemes, employers’ fund entities often appoint outside 
investment managers for portfolios. 
84 These include protection of investors from fund managers’ costs and liabilities or from spillages of risk from 
other management mandates; better investor rights, for example, by offering good and certain exit terms; and 
economies of scale as this structure allows fund managers to operate many funds, thereby lowering fees for all 
investors across funds and making access to investment management possible for a wider range of savers. See, 
further, Morley, n 83 above.  
85 Based on the general law of professional negligence, see Spangler, n 61 above, at paras 4.18-4.25; van Setten, 
n 61 above. at paras 3.51-3.59. 
86 Spangler, ibid, at para 4.26-4.45; van Setten, ibid, at paras 3.60-3.69. 
87 Pensions Act 1995, s 33. 
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limited in what they can call trustees to account. However, they may indeed take comfort 
from the employment of professionalism in investment advice and management, even if this 
means that the structuring of investment management may become more complex, and 
investors have less direct relationships with investment management services providers. 
Matters of investment management are not within the ambit of the investor-fund relationship, 
and can only be raised by the fund entity against the manager.88  
The lack of standing of the ultimate investor is an issue that arose in recent litigation 
commenced by ultimate investors against their fund and depositary for having invested in the 
fraudulent Madoff hedge fund. The court in Dublin, however, rejected that ultimate investors 
had standing to sue as the investment chain has constructed key private law relationships 
between nominees and funds and their service providers. Hence beneficiaries/ultimate 
investors had no direct relationship with funds or service providers to commence legal 
proceedings. This case reflects the trade-off between direct legal accountability and 
accessible, professionalised investment management services for ultimate investors.89 
The Kay Review is also critical about the structure and complexity of investment chains, 
citing their disengagement from the ultimate investors as a matter of concern, as such 
disengagement is observed to entail decline of trust and misalignment of incentives.90 The 
survey carried out by the UK’s Department of Business, Innovation and Skills in 2016 also 
suggests that the value added by various layers in the investment chain is uncertain, and the 
multiplication of complexity and opacity results in investor disengagement from the 
investment process, thus affecting their ability to call investment intermediaries to account.91 
Judge92 rightly argues that the fund management industry is keenly incentivised to create 
layers and complexity in the investment chain as each layer generates transaction fees and is 
an extremely profitable practice for intermediaries. Nevertheless, the specialisation of each 
layer can hardly be faulted in terms of increasing professionalisation of the industry.  
The structural phenomenon of the investment chain creates a diffuse relational web that 
limits investors’ monitoring and recourse. Investors can only look to the fund entity, which, 
however, does not carry out investment management and does not exercise any corporate 
governance rights. The fund manager exercises its discretion as accountable to the collective 
fund entity as a whole, of which any investor’s contribution is only a fraction. The investment 
chain results in a ‘separation of ownership from ownership’,93 a phrase which aptly describes 
how savers no longer have sense of direct ownership of the entities they invest in. This 
channel of ownership is now interposed by the fund manager who acts as manager for the 
                                                          
88 The latter may not be a realistic prospect if the fund manager and the fund are related, i.e. that the fund is 
constituted by the management company to begin with. If the manager is an outsource, there may be more 
realistic prospects of discipline by the fund, but this depends on the terms of the management mandate. 
89 Alico Life International Ltd ("Alico") v Thema International Fund plc ("Thema") and HSBC Institutional 
Trusts Services (Ireland) Limited ("HSBC") and Shmuel Harlap v Thema and HSBC [2016] IEHC 363. 
90 Kay Review, n 7 above, at paras 3.9, 3.10, 4.10, 4.12. 
91  BIS, Exploring the Intermediated Shareholding Model (January 2016), at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/489357/bis-16-20-intermediated-
shareholding-model.pdf. 
92 K. Judge, ‘Intermediary Influence’ (2015) 82 University of Chicago Law Review 573. 
93 See L. E. Strine, ‘Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of 
Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance’ (2007-8) 33 Journal of Corporation 
Law 1; Conference Board, ‘The Separation of Ownership from Ownership’ (2013) at https://www.conference-
board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TCB_DN-V5N22-131.pdf&type=subsite. 
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collective investment fund, of which the saver’s capital is only a part. Modern investment 
management structures ultimately disempower investors from being connected from essential 
aspects of investment management such as corporate governance roles.  
To address this governance deficit McGaughey contends that the lack of investors’ direct 
participation rights in corporate governance must be redressed.94 However, the pros and cons 
of the structure of investment management discussed above make this a matter that is far 
from simplistic. The social/public interest that savers may have in an optimal corporate 
wealth-creating sector may be lost in translation in the structures of modern investment 
management, and institutions substitute their own interests in exercising corporate 
governance rights and powers, no longer reflecting the public and social interest in those 
roles.    
 
III. Company Law and Corporate Governance – Limitations in Governing 
Institutional Shareholders’ Behaviour 
 
The governance position of shareholders in UK companies is framed by a mix of legislative 
mandatory rules, ‘permissive’95 rules, and self-regulatory/soft law rules.96 UK company law 
and soft corporate governance norms (mainly the UK Corporate Governance Code and its 
predecessors) have been about how to impose mechanisms of governance and accountability 
on directors and how to ensure that they pursue the interests of shareholders and not 
themselves underscoring the private agency-based corporate governance paradigm. 97 In this 
part, we argue that this preponderant focus in company law and corporate governance rules 
introduces certain assumptions about the shareholders’ role and conduct which do not 
necessarily hold for institutional investors. Further, we argue that the soft law of stewardship 
cannot effectively entangle the public interests with investment practices. Consequently, the 
current legal framework creates certain governance deficits in relation to the institutions’ 
assumption of their shareholder roles.  
UK Company Law’s Focus on Shareholder Powers on the basis of the ‘Shareholders as 
Monitors’ View 
UK company law has traditionally emphasised directors’ duties and shareholder 
powers/rights in the division between the two main organs of the company. This reflects the 
                                                          
94  E. McGaughey, ‘Participation in Corporate Governance’ (2014) at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2593904 (arguing that these investors’ inability to exercise 
corporate governance rights directly is an unjustified separation of contribution and participation).  
95 These are either ‘enabling’ such as the system of limited liability, or default, such as section 18 of the 
Companies Act 2006 which deals with the articles of association. On private ordering see further, B. R. Cheffins, 
Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 250-256.  
96 On the development of soft law and private ordering in corporate governance, see G. P. Calliess and P. 
Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational Private Law (Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2012), chapter 4.  
97 See, for instance, s 172 CA 2006. The only exception to this deliberate policy choice in favour of stakeholders 
rather than shareholders was during the post-war administration by the Labour Party which promoted the 
development of the ‘social corporation’ which should take proper account of the interests of all engaged persons 
and not simply privilege shareholders. See L.E. Talbot, Critical Company Law (Oxford: Routledge-Cavendish, 
2008), 112-124. 
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centralisation of power and authority in the board of directors,98 and is widely perceived as an 
efficient organisational arrangement,99 but gives rise to the well-discussed agency problems. 
100 The efficiency narrative has become a major support for framing shareholders’ rights and 
powers as being proprietary in nature, 101  in order to proportionately address the agency 
problem presented and establish shareholders as monitors of management.  
Much in alignment with the agency theory, UK company law reserves a wide range of 
powers to shareholders (including voting rights and the right to remove directors without 
cause),102 and promotes their participatory roles for the purposes of constructive monitoring 
and controlling of managerial discretion. Further, to hold directors accountable for their 
failures, great emphasis was placed on directors’ duties, developed in case law from the turn 
of the twentieth century103 and subsequently codified in the Companies Act 2006.104 Unlike 
directors who owe duties to the company under company law, shareholders are regarded as 
not subject to any fiduciary105 duties to the company, or to fellow shareholders.106 As the 
board of directors is the most important decision-making body and the general meeting only 
enjoys reserve powers,107 the notion of duties to be developed for shareholders towards the 
company has seemed unnecessary.108 Nevertheless, opportunities did arise in case law to 
consider how the exercise of shareholder powers should be subject to some qualifications. In 
particular, English case law highlighted some concerns regarding shareholders’ the right to 
vote freely on constitutional amendments, and qualified this right to be subject to the interests 
of the company as a whole,109 and also to refrain from minority shareholder oppression.110 
                                                          
98 For the default division of powers between board and shareholders see Art 3 of the Model Articles for Public 
Companies and relevant case law, such as Quin & Axtens v Salmon [1909] A.C. 442, HL. 
99   See, among others, A. A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization’ (1972) The American Economic Review 777; O. Williamson, ‘Corporate Governance’ (1984) 93 
Yale Law Journal 1197; M. Blair and L. Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ (1994) 85 
Virginia Law Review 657; S. M. Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’ 
(2002) 97 Northwestern University Law Review 547. 
100 See Jensen and Meckling, n 25 above. 
101 The proprietisation of shareholder rights is advocated in S. J. Grossman and O. D. Hart, ‘The Costs and 
Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration’ (1986) 94 Journal of Political Economy 
691. See also Alchian and Demsetz, n 101 above (on the residual claimant theory). 
102 Companies Act 2006, ss 188ff, s 168. In addition shareholders in the UK enjoy several procedural rights in 
relation to general meeting, including the right to initiate a meeting, to add an item on the agenda and the right 
to circulate a statement. See Companies Act ss 314-6 and 338. 
103 See, for example, Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421 stating in no uncertain terms that directors’ fiduciary 
duties are owed to the company; Cook v Deeks (PC) [1916] 1 AC 554 indicting directors for self-dealing. 
104 Companies Act, ss 170-182. 
105 On the nature of the fiduciary duty, see M. Conaglen, ‘The Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty' (2005) 
121 Law Quarterly Review 453; R. Flannigan, ‘The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability’ (2007) 32 
Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 393.  
106 This is in marked contrast with the US legal regime, which imposes fiduciary duties on majority controlling 
shareholders and in closely held private companies. See P. J. Dalley, ‘The Misguided Doctrine of Stockholder 
Fiduciary Duties’ (2004) 33 Hofstra Law Review 175; J. Dammann, ‘The Controlling Shareholder's General 
Duty of Care: A Dogma That Should Be Abandoned’ (2015) University Illinois Law Review 479. 
107 See the line of case law on the need for a special majority to exercise reserve power, Quin & Axtens Ltd v 
Salmon [1909] AC 442; Marshall's Valve Gear Co Ltd v Manning Wardle & Co Ltd [1909] 1 Ch 267. See also 
Model Articles for Private Companies Limited by Shares, Art 4. 
108 However, liability can be imposed on shareholders qua director or qua officer. See Cook v Deeks (PC) [1916] 
1 AC 554. 
109 Allen v Gold Reefs of W. Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 656; Brown v. British Abrasive Wheel Co [1919] 1 Ch 290; 
Dafen Tinplate Co Ltd. v Llanelli Steel Co [1920] 2 Ch 124. 
110 Arbuthnott v Bonnyman & 18 Ors [2015] EWCA Civ 536. 
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These qualifications reflect attempts to strike a balance between deference towards the quasi-
proprietary nature of the right to vote,111 and concerns that shareholder power should not be 
totally unbridled. However, incremental developments in case law never gave rise to a 
coherent framework for the governance of shareholders’ control powers, as the narrative 
merely shifted to issues relating to the protection of minority shareholders.112 
The ‘shareholders as monitors’ view which supports strong participatory rights but almost 
no duties has been reinforced following the global financial crisis 2007-9, which saw the 
near-failure of a number of important British banks. One of the policy findings in post-crisis 
diagnosis is that institutions should play a greater role in corporate governance in order to 
monitor management that may drive companies into corporate failure.113 The Walker Review 
was specifically tasked to look into corporate governance in certain failed financial 
institutions during the financial crisis.114 The Review concluded that shareholders ought to 
monitor and be supported in such positions in order to call management to account. The UK 
subsequently introduced a suite of legislative reforms to enhance shareholder engagement.    
Perhaps most importantly, a mandatory shareholder vote on the remuneration policy at the 
shareholders’ annual general meeting was introduced in 2013, in addition to an advisory vote 
on implementation.115 The UK was the forerunner in mandating public companies to allow 
shareholders an advisory vote on the annual remuneration report in 2002,116 which became 
compulsory in 2013. The new regime aims to give shareholders more leverage on executive 
pay, as the companies are only permitted to pay remuneration to their directors in line with a 
remuneration policy that has been previously approved at the general meeting. Advocates of 
say on pay contend that strengthening the shareholders’ role in the setting of managerial 
compensation promotes a stronger link between pay and performance and increases the 
accountability of corporate directors to shareholders. 117  In addition, they anticipate that 
shareholders, and especially institutional investors, will actively participate in the setting of 
executive pay demanding changes that better align directors’ remuneration with the long-term 
interests and sustainability of the company.118 
Further, corporate transparency was reformed post-crisis to provide shareholders with 
more meaningful information. The key legislative reform introduced was the overhaul of 
                                                          
Northern Counties Securities Ltd v Jackson & Steeples Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 1133. 
112 Such as the minority oppression remedy under Companies Act 1948, s 210 that was later reformed to be the 
unfair prejudice petition remedy under Companies Act 1985, s 459 and Companies Act 2006, s 994.  
113 R. Tomasic and F. Akinbami (2011) ‘Towards a new corporate governance after the global financial crisis’ 
International Company & Commercial Law Review 237. 
114 Walker Review, n 8 above. 
115 Companies Act 2006, ss 226B, 226C, 439 and 439A. On the impact of UK corporate governance reforms on 
executive rewards, see S. Thomspon, ‘Executive pay and corporate governance reform in the UK: what has 
been achieved?’ in R. S. Thomas and J. G. Hill (eds.), Research Handbook on Executive Pay (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), 58.  
116 The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, SI 2002/1986. 
117 See, for example, Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation: Hearing on H.R. 1257 
Before the Committee on Financial Services, 110th Congress 68 (2007) (written testimony of L. A. 
Bebchuk, W. J. Friedman and A. Townsend Friedman), at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
110hhrg35402/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg35402.pdf. 
118 For some early findings doubting that shareholder scrutiny on pay is effective, see C. Gerner-Buerle and T. 
Kirschmaier, ‘Say on Pay: Do Shareholders Care?’ (2016), at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2720481.  
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directors’ annual reporting and the introduction of the Strategic Report in 2013. 119  The 
Strategic Report is a move towards enhanced narrative reporting which sets financial 
reporting in context so that shareholders can engage with companies bearing in mind their 
unique strategic and operating contexts. Narrative reporting is seen as a way to encourage 
intelligent and ‘tailor-made’ shareholder engagement. 120  Further, the Financial Reporting 
Council has also issued guidelines on directors’ business and financial reporting that directors 
should include a longer-term viability statement in the Strategic Report in order to advise 
shareholders of any longer term risks and outlooks that may affect the viability of the 
company in a period exceeding twelve months.121 With increased mandatory transparency, 
the information environment for shareholders has been improved and it is arguably 
reasonable to expect more engagement and monitoring on the part of institutional 
shareholders. 
In addition to empowering shareholders under company law, policy-makers supported soft 
law reforms that reinforce shareholder empowerment via the Financial Reporting Council’s 
adoption of the Institutional Shareholder Committee’s skeletal Code of conduct in relation to 
shareholder engagement. The Code has been rebranded into a ‘Stewardship’ code, framing 
shareholder engagement into an exercise of responsible ownership which connects the private 
interests of institutions to their perceived socially important role.  
The UK Stewardship Code: A First but Inadequate Step to Address the Public Interests in 
the Governance Role of Institutions 
While many of the provisions of the UK Corporate Governance Code are likely to enhance 
the shareholder status of institutional investors in public companies as they provide an 
effective channel of communication between institutional shareholders and boards,122 the UK 
Stewardship Code represents the most detailed attempt to date in the UK to address the 
relationships of institutions and asset managers with their investee companies. The 
Stewardship Code contains seven main Principles and is enforced on a ‘comply or explain’ 
basis. 123  ‘Stewardship’, in the language of the Stewardship Code, ‘is more than just 
voting’.124 It also includes ‘monitoring and engaging with companies on matters such as 
                                                          
119 Companies Act 2006, ss 414A and 414C. 
120 Discussed in I. H-Y Chiu, ‘Reviving Shareholder Stewardship: Critically Examining the Impact of Corporate 
Transparency Reforms in the UK’ (2014) 38 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 983. 
121 FRC, Guidance on Risk Management, Internal Control and Related Financial and Business Reporting (Sep 
2014), at https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/Guidance-on-Risk-
Management,-Internal-Control-and.pdf. This initiative was in response to the critique levied by institutions in 
the wake of the global financial crisis that going-concern statements of certain banks before the onset of the 
crisis were not accurate. The state of the going-concern certification was the subject of the Sharman Inquiry who 
advocated that the concept of ‘going concern’ did have to be clarified, and that shareholders needed more 
context-rich information in which to thoroughly assess companies’ future prospects. See The Sharman Inquiry, 
Going Concern and Liquidity Risks: Lessons for Companies and Auditors, Final Report and Recommendations 
of the Panel of Inquiry (June 2012), at http://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/591a5e2a-35d7-4470-a46c-
30c0d8ca2a14/Sharman-Inquiry-Final-Report.aspx; and the FRC’s feedback statement, at 
https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Headline-projects/The-Sharman-Inquiry.aspx.  
122  For instance, boards with substantial independent director representation are preferred by institutional 
investors. See J.A. McCahery, Z. Sautner and L.T. Starks (2016) ‘Behind the Scenes: The Corporate 
Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors’ Journal of Finance _ 
123 See generally J. G. Parkinson and G. Kelly, ‘The Combined Code of Corporate Governance’ (1999) The 
Political Quarterly 101. 
124 UK Stewardship Code, p 1. 
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strategy, performance, risk, capital structure, and corporate governance, including culture and 
remuneration’ through voting and the development of a ‘purposeful dialogue’.125  
On the one hand, building on the traditional agency paradigm of corporate governance126 
the Stewardship Code encourages institutional engagement as a valuable check on managerial 
abuses and legitimates the acceptable forms of shareholder activism which would be treated 
as ‘stewardship’. These include both formal exercise of shareholder rights and informal 
engagement outside of the general meeting context (Principle 4), including collective 
engagement on the part of institutions (Principle 5). The informal powers that shareholders 
can exercise through ‘voice’ are now articulated ever more clearly in the Stewardship Code, 
but it could also be said that the Code sets out the expectations of ‘proper’ shareholder 
behaviour. In this way, the form of contemporary shareholder activism carried out by hedge 
funds (including wolf-packs), which is regarded with some scepticism in the UK and 
Continental Europe, may have to conform to the standards found in the Code.  
On the other hand, as we discuss above the Stewardship Code embodies the aspiration of 
governance that UK policy makers hope to impress upon institutions following the financial 
crisis. The notion of stewardship, following on from the Walker and Kay Reviews, 
emphasises on long-termism and the wider public interests associated with investor-led 
governance. The Stewardship Code encourages asset managers and owners to be cognisant of 
the public interest in their role, and therefore to move away from a monolithic emphasis on 
the ‘shareholder as monitor’ view associated with the private agency-based corporate 
governance paradigm. Stewardship is therefore, viewed as antidote to short-termism. For 
instance, the reference to wider economic stress under Principle 5 which encourages 
collective action among institutional investors seems to have the effect of disavowing 
collective engagement in the interests of private, value-centred objectives and framing 
shareholder engagement within normative expectations that are consistent with wider public 
interests.127 Also, Principles 1, 2, 6 and 7 of the Stewardship Code dealing with the public 
disclosure of and periodic reporting on stewardship and voting policies do not merely target 
the institutions’ beneficiaries. Rather, public disclosure and reporting serve wider interests 
and enable the public to scrutinise the stewardship activities of institutions and assess their 
governance role. The UK Stewardship Code is, in our view, the first attempt to align private 
and public interests and correct the governance deficits that alienate institutions’ corporate 
governance roles from wider public interests.  
However, the effectiveness of the Stewardship Code to address these governance deficits 
is questionable. First, it is doubtful that the public interest of long-termism aspired by the 
Stewardship Code and the private interests of institutional investors are always coterminous. 
For some, institutional investors cannot act as a monitoring force that will moderate excessive 
risk-taking. For instance, Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann128  argue that shareholder short-
termism acted as real pressures for their investee banks before the global financial crisis of 
2007-9 and was at least complicit in excessive risk-taking by banks that later failed during the 
                                                          
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 M. Andenas and I. Chiu The Foundations and Future of Financial Regulation: Governance for 
Responsibility (London and New York: Routledge, 2014). 
128 L. Bebchuk, A. Cohen and H. Spamann, ‘The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns 
and Lehman 2000-2008’ (2010) 27 Yale Journal on Regulation and Public Policy 257. 
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crisis. 129  Others remain sceptical as to whether shareholder behaviour can indeed be 
moderated into socially optimal forms as envisaged in the Stewardship Code. For example, 
Talbot argues that shareholders are inherently unable to fulfil the role of injecting long-
termism into corporate culture and stewardship, and hence empowering them through 
‘stewardship’ and more engagement is futile and would only fuel short-termism.130 Further, 
Cheffins opined that the national character of the Code is unlikely to appeal to foreign 
investors who own the bulk of UK corporate equity and thus the Code is unlikely to foster 
investor-led governance.131  
In our view, the Stewardship Code is ideologically perplexed. Even though the Code 
conceptualises investor-led governance within a public-interest framing and is not merely a 
reiteration of private agency-based concept of institutions as monitors, it continues to make 
overly optimistic assumptions about the motivations of different types of institutions and their 
alignment with socially beneficial effects in the long-term, 132 and there is a lack of critically 
examining shareholder behaviour and distilling a balanced slate of pros and cons to consider 
for appropriate governance.133 The Code’s rhetorical and ambiguous premises are more likely 
to pander to institutions’ private interests, while doing little to effectively call them to public 
account in the process of bolstering their powers. 
On the practical front, it is also questionable whether asset managers to whom the Code is 
primarily addressed will be willing to step into the governance role aspired by the notion of 
stewardship. The fierce competition between asset managers on the basis of relative 
performance arguably creates little incentives to improve the long-term value of investee 
companies and promote wider public interests. This is evident in the decreasing numbers of 
Code’s signatories in the last two years and the shift of the FRC’s attention from the quantity 
to the quality of signatories. The FRC introduced in November 2016 public tiering of 
signatories to the Code in an attempt to improve the quality of reporting against the principles 
of the Code and create a market incentive in support of engagement.134 It is hoped that this 
will help asset owners to judge how well their fund manager is delivering on their 
commitments under the Stewardship Code, help those who value engagement to choose the 
right asset managers and in consequence create a ‘stewardship market’ for asset managers,135 
but it still too early to judge on the efficiency of this public tiering exercise. Further, some 
proxy advisers continue to take a rigid box-ticking approach and pay insufficient attention to 
comply or explain. This could have a knock-on effect on the quality of stewardship activities 
undertake by asset managers as the latter often outsource voting to proxy advisers.  
                                                          
129 But see P. Davies, ‘Shareholders in the United Kingdom’ in J. G. Hill and R. S. Thomas (eds.), Research 
Handbook on Shareholder Power (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2015). 
130  L. E. Talbot, ‘Why Shareholders Shouldn’t Vote: A Marxist-progressive Critique of Shareholder 
Empowerment’ (2013) 76 Modern Law Review 791. 
131 B. R. Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship Code’s Achilles Heel’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 1004. 
132  See also I.H.Y. Chiu, ‘Turning Institutional Investors into “Stewards”- Exploring the Meaning and 
Objectives of “Stewardship”’ (2013) Current Legal Problems 1; S. C. Y. Wong, ‘Is Institutional Investor 
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133 This is extensively examined in Barker and Chiu, n 20 above. 
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135 See Katelouzou, n 59 above. 
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Another weakness of the Code is the fuzziness as to whom institutions are accountable as 
stewards. 136  If accountability is to the institutions’ beneficiaries the Code does not add 
anything to the trusteeship duties already involved. And, we have explained above that 
beneficiaries are too indifferent and dispersed to hold institutions to account for their 
stewardship obligations. However, if institutions’ accountability as stewards means 
something more, as we would expect on the basis of the public interest embodied in the Code, 
it remains unclear to whom institutions are accountable. And, the exclusion of stakeholders 
from the stewardship spectrum137 suggests that too much deference is still paid to the private 
agency paradigm of corporate governance in the discharge of the responsibilities of 
institutional shareholders as owners.  
Finally, the Code, being soft law,138 does not provide adequately for the accountability and 
governance mechanisms that would check and balance shareholders’ enhanced engagement 
roles and powers. Indeed, as the FRC has found,139 soft law approaches intending to bring 
about incremental effects produce very slow results. More fundamentally, soft law 
approaches, bound in private paradigms of shareholder accountability,140 could undermine the 
public interest aspirations of the Stewardship Code and are unable to change investment 
management at heart. Even though the soft law of stewardship challenges the monolithic 
shareholder-as-monitor view underpinning much of the UK company law and attempts to 
conflate the public interests in investor-led governance with the private paradigm of corporate 
governance, it is too weak to ensure a concomitant governance and accountability for 
institutions for the wider public. We argue, therefore, that the public interest underlying the 
notion of stewardship obligations for institutions can find more overt articulation in the 
securities and investment regulation, to which we now turn.   
 
IV.     Making a Case for Governing Institutional Shareholders’ Conduct in Investee 
Companies under Securities and Investment Regulation 
 
We have shown so far that the assumption of corporate governance roles by institutions has 
become disengaged from savers due to the interposition of collective investment structures 
and the growth of the investment chain. Savers are generally disinterested and are unlikely to 
be able to exert strong governance powers over fund managers’ assumption of corporate 
governance roles. Further, company law and corporate governance standards do not take into 
account the institutional shareholders’ unique positions and their hitherto pro-shareholder 
stance is incompatible with the public interest in the impact of institutions’ corporate 
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governance roles upon long-term wealth creation by the corporate sector. Institutional 
shareholders are not ‘fiduciary capitalists’141  representing savers’ interests and their own 
interests dominate in their shareholding capacity, profoundly affecting their corporate 
governance roles. This is a development that is not taken into account of in the private 
paradigm of company law; company law has not developed maturing notions of shareholder 
duties and recent policy reforms have focused on shareholder empowerment without due 
consideration of how shareholder empowerment should be made accountable or governed. 
We are also of the view that the soft law of the Stewardship Code, despite its public-interest 
framing, is not either clear or adequate in articulating a framework for articulating 
institutions’ accountability. Merely asking institutions to report to their beneficiaries is not 
constructive given the distance and limits on the part of beneficiaries to monitor their fund 
managers. 
In this part we suggest that in order to take into account of the wider stakeholder and 
socio-economic ramifications of institutions’ corporate governance roles, there is a public 
interest case for subjecting institutions’ corporate governance roles to regulatory standards 
and monitoring. The private law frameworks discussed above do not adequately address the 
wider public interests associated with investor-led governance and how this impact the 
corporate sector’s long-term wealth creation to deliver the expectations of savers who are 
now enrolled into the financialised system of private saving via collective investment. Indeed, 
the private law frameworks are even increasingly inadequate to serve their original purposes 
in ensuring accountability within a trust context and in relation to the division of powers in a 
company.  
Regulators are not agnostic to the long-term socio-economic impact of investment 
management and in recent years there has been an increasing regulatory attention to ensuring 
that investment management is an area properly governed. Prudential regulation has been 
introduced for defined benefit pension schemes for some time now, 142  and although the 
development of defined contribution schemes removes the financial pressures that apply to 
defined benefit schemes, regulatory governance has been introduced for defined contribution 
schemes in terms of its scheme governance143 and oversight, as well as fair management 
fees.144 EU legislation, transposed into UK law, has extended prudential regulation to retail 
investment funds that are open-ended,145 and to alternative investment funds.146 Further, EU-
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derived regulation has introduced standardised duties for investor protection, 147  and 
transposed in the UK, such regulation has boosted investor accountability and enforcement 
via regular reporting.148 Regulation has focused on investor protection in the institution-
beneficiary relationship and has to date not addressed the public interest concern underlying 
the financialisation of savings which is mediated through institutions.  
The regulation of institutions’ corporate governance role is timely and is consistent with 
the ethos in securities regulation and investment conduct regulation. We propose a blueprint 
below; we first suggest that institutions should be regulated in terms of disclosing their 
corporate governance intentions and roles appropriately to the market, so that these roles are 
not used instrumentally to create unfairness in securities markets. Second, institutions should 
be governed under investment regulation in terms of their conduct of investment management 
in order to achieve adequate investor protection and to mitigate the externalities of short-
termism discussed earlier. 
A Case for Governing Institutions’ Shareholder Roles in Securities Regulation 
At first blush, regulating institutional shareholders as a matter of securities regulation looks 
contrary to the erstwhile approach in securities regulation that imposes duties on publicly 
traded companies vis a vis their investors. Securities regulation is chiefly premised on 
investor protection, seeking not only to promote efficient capital markets but also fair markets 
in which investors have confidence. The broad categories of duties in securities regulation are 
mandatory disclosure to primary markets,149 mandatory continuing disclosure to secondary 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
mutual funds known as UCITs are to have an initial capital at 125,000 euros and own funds at 0.02% of assets 
under management. This is transposed in the UK FCA Handbook, IPRU-INV chapter 5. 
146  See Art 9, Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations 
(EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010 (AIFMD 2011), under which hedge and private equity funds that 
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companies, and were transposed in the UK via The Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable 
Securities Regulations 2011, SI 2011/1613.  
See also Art 12, Directive 2011/61/EU of the European parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations 
(EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010, which imposes on fund managers direct duties to investors in 
conduct of business. Specifically, Article 12 provides for investor protection duties on care, skill and diligence, 
to employ resources effectively for the performance of due functions, to manage conflicts of interest, to act in 
the best interests of investors, to comply with all regulatory requirements and to treat investors fairly. This was 
transposed into UK law via the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Regulations 2013 (SI 2013/1773).  
148 Regular reporting is mandated under the UCITs Directive 2009, for example Arts 68, 69, 73, and the AIFMD 
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markets,150 corporate governance obligations that secure minority shareholder protection151 
and other duties imposed on non-issuer constituents that may affect investors (such as 
disclosure duties on analysts152 and underwriters).153 
Mandatory disclosure is often justified to ensure that optimal amounts of accurate 
information are released in order to foster an efficient securities market,154 in which the 
market prices efficiently reflect all information underlying the securities at any given time. 
Price efficiency promotes fairness and certainty, and supports investor participation in the 
markets. Even if we may not fully subscribe to the efficient capital markets hypothesis155 and 
the model of the information-hungry rational investor,156 the duty to be transparent via public 
disclosures achieves the additional benefit of securing accountability on the part of corporate 
management, 157  and invites scrutiny into the veracity of disclosures, the quality of 
governance and the promises of the business in general. Hence, market transparency is an 
essential tenet of investor protection regulation. 
Corporate transparency to the marketplace has always been imposed on companies, but 
securities regulation also recognises that disclosure by investors is becoming increasingly 
relevant to the information environment of the securities markets. In the UK, an investor 
acquiring shares in a publicly traded company must inform the issuer and the Listing 
Authority (the Financial Conduct Authority) of her holdings if she crosses a 3% threshold and 
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every 1% thereafter.158 Further, EU regulation compels net short sellers in equities to disclose 
to the relevant regulator short positions from 0.2% of the company’s equity onwards with 
every increase of 0.1%.159 Where short positions reach 0.5% of the company’s equity, public 
disclosure needs to be made by the net short seller.160  
It may be argued that it is not only investor holdings/interests and identities that may be 
price-sensitive information in the marketplace, but, as investors are asked and expected to 
engage with companies,161 engagement agendas and behaviour may also become important 
signals in the marketplace for other investors.162  In the US, institutions that acquire 5% or 
more of a publicly traded company’s equity as beneficial owners must disclose the stake and 
the purpose of the investment.163 In the EU, the Transparency Directive is silent on the issue 
of intentions-related disclosure, but some EU Member States, including France and Germany, 
impose additional disclosure obligations for large investors in relation to the objectives 
pursued by their investment.164 The disclosure of investment objectives is increasingly being 
viewed as a price-sensitive signal to the market as signals of shareholder activism intentions 
will likely affect share price. Much empirical research on hedge fund activism points to the 
share price effects that entail from an announcement of beneficial stakes by activist hedge 
funds.165  It may reasonably be argued that the investment value of a company may be 
perceived by investors to be affected by how other investors relate to it. Hence, increased 
transparency should be imposed on institutional shareholders, such as in relation to 
shareholder engagement intentions, plans and outcomes.  
Further, securities regulation is keenly concerned with minority shareholder protection, 
and, in our view, regulatory standards should be introduced to ensure that institutional 
shareholders’ assumption of corporate governance roles does not adversely affect minority 
shareholder protection objectives. Since the seminal thesis by La Porta et al166 supporting the 
important relationship between law and finance, and, in particular, contending that the 
protection of minority shareholders affects the development of securities markets, practical 
steps have been taken in many key capital markets jurisdictions167  to improve minority 
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shareholder protection through securities regulation (such as disclosure regimes) and through 
the introduction of corporate governance standards168 for listed companies. These standards 
are perceived to provide minority shareholders with a sense of protection and assurance in the 
governance quality of companies listed on those markets. 
In our view, minority shareholders are not only concerned about corporate governance 
standards for Boards.169 Increasingly, minority shareholders are also concerned about the 
composition and dynamics of the company’s shareholding structure, as these affect the 
quality of governance. Evidently, minority shareholders are concerned about controlling 
shareholders, as the fiascos with respect to the previously London-listed ENRC and Bumi 
have heightened disquiet about controlling shareholders’ expropriation of the companies, and 
negative impacts on company share price.170 Also, minority shareholders’ attention is often 
paid to the issue of dual-class voting rights due to often disproportionate voting power certain 
special shareholders enjoy despite low cash flow rights. 171  Other minority shareholders’ 
concerns may relate to (a) differences in corporate governance rights between long- and 
short-term shareholders, such as in relation to the recent French reforms which give long-
term investors double voting rights; 172  (b) activist shareholders, 173  and (c) shareholders 
whose voting rights are decoupled from economic rights and thus may have perverse 
incentives in exercising voting rights (‘the empty voting’ concern).174 
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empirical evidence on the increased valuation of companies on securities markets driven by investor preferences 
where good corporate governance is instituted, see F. Bertoni, M. Meoli, and S. Vismara, ‘Board Independence, 
Ownership Structure and the Valuation of IPOs in Continental Europe’ (2014) 22 Corporate Governance 116; L. 
D. Brown and M. L. Caylor, ‘Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation’ (2009) 25 Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy 409 (arguing that there are only a few cherished corporate governance notions that make a 
difference eg independent directors); K. H. Chung and H. Zhang, ‘Corporate Governance and Institutional 
Ownership’ (2011) 46 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 247; A. Picou and M. J. Rubach, ‘Does 
Good Governance Matter to Institutional Investors? Evidence from the Enactment of Corporate Governance 
Guidelines’ (2006) 65 Journal of Business Ethics 55. 
169 Such as in relation to Board composition (eg independent representation, institution of committees or gender 
diversity), or to executive compensation.  
170 Discussed in Barker and Chiu, n 171 above. 
171 For example, Google’s founder shareholders Larry Page and Sergey Brin have retained significant control of 
55.7% after the initial public offer of shares despite having only 15% of the cash flow rights.  They cite their 
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Alibaba.com from China continue to attract investors who wish to share in the upside of successful companies 
led by talented founders (despite their apparently weak position as minority shareholders). 
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Some of these issues have been recognised and addressed to different extents. For example, 
the UK Listing Rules have been amended to subject controlling shareholders of Premium-
listed companies on the London Stock Exchange to certain governance arrangements with 
their companies in order to prevent disproportionate exercises of power that adversely affect 
minority shareholders. 175  Although dual class shares are not prohibited in the UK and 
certainly feature in many prominent companies listed on the key stock exchanges in New 
York, they are not without controversy. The French endorsement of greater rights for longer 
term shareholders is also not without controversy as such a measure can be seen as a means 
of empowering incumbent (domestic) shareholders against foreign minority investors new to 
the company.176 Activist shareholders may also not be regarded as an unequivocal good as 
different forms of activism exist and some may be disruptive and negatively affect the 
company.177 Further, empty voting may pose as a snare to fellow investors, although policy-
makers have not found sufficient evidence to warrant regulatory intervention.178 
The above is a survey of the issues relating to institutional shareholder conduct that ought 
to be studied in framing securities regulation for institutions’ corporate governance roles for 
the purposes of maintaining fair and transparent capital markets. Next, we turn to the case for 
introducing regulation for institutions’ corporate governance roles as a matter of investment 
management practice. 
A Case for Governing Institutions’ Shareholder Roles in Investment Management 
Regulation 
We contend that regulatory standards of conduct should be introduced for investment 
management, in order to account for the effectiveness of investment management over the 
long-term and the exercise of corporate governance roles as part of that. These standards of 
conduct may be formulated for different entities in the investment chain discussed earlier in 
this article. The development of a regulatory regime achieves the ‘publicisation’ of 
investment management as a matter of public interest, by articulating standards for optimal 
and accountable investment management, and making certain investment management 
practices a matter for regulatory compliance. Further, there is the possibility of investors 
mounting civil actions or breach of statutory duty on the back of successful regulatory 
enforcement.179 
The EU has already introduced legislation that deals with the corporate governance roles 
of retail collective investment funds. In 2010, the European Commission introduced an 
initiative to improve investor protection by imposing conduct of business obligations on 
management companies of UCITS funds.180 As part of regulating the investment management 
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practices of fund managers, the Directive also imposes a duty on management companies to 
develop policies on how their voting rights in investee companies should be exercised for the 
benefit of the funds. Management companies are also to consider how forms of shareholder 
engagement or activism may be carried out in order to secure the best interests of the 
funds.181 
Further, the governance deficits in the investment chain discussed above have recently 
attracted the attention of regulators in the UK and EU. In the UK, the Law Commission 
acknowledges that pension funds use pension consultants to advise them on asset allocation 
and the appointment of suitable asset managers.182 As there are only a handful of dominant 
consultancies in the market, such as Mercer and Towers Watson, and pension funds rely 
heavily on consultants’ advice, the Law Commission suggests that regulatory standards and 
scrutiny should be extended to them to ensure that principal-agent problems are mitigated and 
that consistency be maintained with other regulatory regimes for investment.183 
In the EU, the European Commission is concerned about how asset managers and proxy 
advisors are relatively unregulated although they wield significant influence in funds’ 
corporate governance positions. The proposed EU Shareholders’ Rights Directive184 contains 
provisions that subject asset managers and proxy advisers to certain transparency obligations, 
showing increasing interest in governing their roles and accountability in the investment 
chain. Articles 3g and 3h of the proposed Directive deals with disclosure by institutions to the 
public, and by asset managers to their institutional clients, in order to account for how asset 
managers meet their clients’ needs in terms of investment horizon and maturity of liabilities. 
The European Parliament further suggests amendments to require that a part of asset 
managers’ disclosures be made public, reflecting the public interest their roles.185 Article 3i 
of the proposed Shareholders’ Rights Directive imposes a duty on proxy advisory agencies to 
‘ensure to the best of their ability that their research and voting recommendations are accurate 
and reliable, based on a thorough analysis of all the information that is available to them, and 
are developed in the sole interest of their clients’. These agencies are further subject to 
conduct standards in voluntary codes of conduct where they may be applicable. As proxy 
advisers play an important role in supporting institutions’ voting and hence key decision-
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making powers at the general meeting of the company, it is regarded as a matter of public 
interest that proxy advisers’ influence over institutions’ corporate governance roles be subject 
to appropriate standards of conduct and public scrutiny. Indeed, the European Commission, 
in introducing these amendments, explains186 that improving shareholder engagement is for 
the purposes of addressing the issue of excessive short termism on the part of the asset 
management industry in managing institutional funds. The Commission’s concerns are rooted 
in public interest concerns regarding the viability of pension savings through investment, and 
the proposed provisions are arguably a form of re-regulation. 
The developments above show that policy-makers are increasingly supportive of 
introducing standards for scrutinising investment management practices, their corporate 
governance roles being seen as a key aspect of their investment management practices. 
However, the above are rather limited. They are patchwork in nature as they focus on 
particular aspects of investment management practices without a holistic consideration of the 
nature of investment management practices as a whole. Further, the proposed European 
Directive adopts a comply-or-explain approach which is odd given its underlying concern for 
the public interest in institutions’ corporate governance roles and many of its public 
disclosure and accountability requirements.187  
We support further steps to be taken to develop a comprehensive regulatory regime in the 
UK for entities in the investment chain, from standard setting to supervisory accountability. 
We believe that there should be greater regulatory accountability for the objectives in 
shareholder engagement, and such engagement should be for the long-term well-being of the 
company taking into account of other shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests. Asset 
managers must also show how their shareholder engagement behaviour is not tainted by 
conflicts of interest. The roles of investment chain entities also need to be properly 
accountable for the overall public interest of savers. We are of the view that the securities and 
financial regulator in the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority is well-placed to regulate 
institutions’ investment management practices, including their shareholder behaviour. 
Some Initial Thoughts on Implementing an Effective Model of Regulatory Duties 
First, investment funds and their asset managers should explain how their strategies, 
including the use of corporate governance rights and powers, are aligned with the long-term 
interests of savers. Consistent with the proposed EU Shareholders’ Rights Directive we 
believe that such targeted, public interest-oriented reporting from asset managers and asset 
owners is a necessary first step. The reporting obligations under Articles 3g and 3h of the 
proposed EU Shareholders’ Rights Directive are to the public, and will import of wider 
scrutiny from regulators. One drawback, however, is that such reporting may be qualitative 
and difficult to judge, and the regulator may need to develop in time a set of best practices 
such as non-mechanistic reliance on corporate governance service providers, meaningful and 
not overly frequent portfolio turnover etc. We believe this area to be under-developed and 
this paper provides  a starting point, which can be further refined in terms of detail.  
Next, we consider it necessary to impose standards on service providers in the investment 
chain to manage conflicts of interest robustly and to adhere to the standard of having the 
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ultimate savers’ interests in mind. As entities in the investment chain do not owe private law 
duties to the ultimate savers’, the diffusion of legal duties through investment management 
structuration has weakened the sense of purpose of saver-focused investment management 
which is aligned with public interest and social good. Regulatory duties can overcome the 
lack of appropriate private law duties and accountability, and re-introduce an orientation 
towards public-interest for all entities in the investment chain. And, we foresee subjecting 
fund managers, pension consultants, and proxy advisers to such a standard. 
We do not necessarily think that forcing funds or asset managers to informally engage or 
vote, as the UK Stewardship Code envisages is certainly representative of good practice in 
looking after savers’ long-term interests. These actions are symptomatic and procedural, 
while the substantive good of savers’ long-term interests need not be represented in them. An 
asset manager can actively agitate a company for share buy-backs for example, which could 
be short-termist in nature and adverse to the company’s use of retained earnings in the long-
term. Thus, the engagement in visible forms of action says nothing about the substantive 
good of protecting savers’ long-term interests through constructive corporate governance 
roles in investee companies. Indeed there may be a case to impose a regulatory duty to refrain 
from short-termist actions that may have adverse long-term impact. 
Scepticism of Regulation as an Optimal Governance Solution? 
So far, we have set out a case for arguing that investment management practices affecting the 
institutions’ corporate governance role should be regulated as a distinct regime extending 
from securities regulation and investment management law. However, it may be objected that 
even if institutions’ shareholder roles need to be subject to a form of governance, regulation 
is not an optimal means to provide such governance.188 
First, one may argue that regulating the corporate governance role of institutions under 
securities and investment management regulation law takes away the benefits of the self-
regulation approach which characterises UK corporate governance. Corporate governance in 
the UK is largely viewed as an internal matter for companies and the involvement of policy-
makers is largely facilitative, shaped by bottom-up influences from the industry itself, rather 
than prescriptive. Although self-regulation in theory can have advantages in terms of 
flexibility, expertise and cost, compared to regulation by government, none of these are clear-
cut.189 Take, for instance, the Stewardship Code. The Code, being ‘soft’ in nature (but not 
purely self-regulatory), may help to deliver flexibility via its comply-or-explain approach and 
open-textured principles. On the other hand, it concomitantly involves insufficient certainty 
and weak enforcement.190   
Another objection some might raise to our proposal is that regulation is not a panacea for 
governance deficits. It may be argued that by introducing regulatory standards for investment 
management, such standards will become a body of obligations for compliance, and will 
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further fail to meet investors’ needs, increasing their disengagement and disempowerment 
from the investment management process. It cannot be assumed that the regulator is best 
placed to substitute the essential monitoring that investors need to carry out to ensure that 
their collective private interests are met in the long term. Regulatory standards may be rigid, 
over-or under-inclusive, and would be ‘one-size-fits-all’. However, we are of the view that 
investor disengagement and disempowerment is already a structural problem and regulatory 
governance can introduce much-needed change instead of waiting for collective saver 
initiatives to arise. In other words, even if regulatory governance cannot take the place of 
investors’ own monitoring for their private interests, it performs an imperfect substitutive 
effect that is superior to the situation of the current lacunae. Further, regulatory enforcement 
can overcome much of the limitations in enforcement faced by investors in terms of causes of 
action and the collective action problem. Finally, the introduction of regulatory standards is 
able to more clearly articulate the objectives of investment management in key categories of 
savings such as pension schemes that take into account the public interest dimension. We see 
the potential for regulation to provide clarity for investments based on corporate social 
responsibility indicators, an area that has been dogged by uncertainties and limitations in 
private law.191  
Finally, it may be argued that regulatory standards are not able to presume what optimal 
roles in corporate governance institutions should assume. Hence, regulatory standards may be 
worded broadly and leave much to regulator’s discretion to carry out enforcement, often with 
the benefit of hindsight. This creates a chilling environment for investment management, a 
business that is essentially concerned with judgment and risk-taking. Making investment fund 
managers too risk averse is not in the interests of investors who need a return for their savings 
over the long term. However, we are of the view that regulatory standards and their 
enforcement need not create an adversarial relationship between investment managers and 
regulators. Widely worded regulatory standards are rooted in principles, such as in the 11 
principles for investment regulation promulgated by the FCA and its predecessors,192 and best 
practices can be forged in more concrete terms as guidelines that can change and be flexible. 
The UK regulator had had many years of experience in principles-based regulation and 
working with the industry to forge interpretive guidance.193 In fact, much of the critique 
against principles-based regulation is based on the regulator’s willingness to listen 
excessively to industry needs and be subject to a form of capture. 194  We suggest that a 
mixture of rules and principles-based regulation in investment management practices can 
provide a framework to align investment management practices with public interests. 
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Conclusion 
In this article we make a case for governing the assumption of corporate governance roles by 
institutional shareholders and their fund managers. We argue that institutional shareholder 
conduct as an investment management practice raises concerns in relation to its possibly 
deleterious impact on companies and it is to be queried whether savers’ and corporate 
interests over the long-term are well-served by institutions’ shareholder roles, however 
practised. Private law frameworks for investor-intermediary relationships and in company 
law and corporate governance standards do not deal with the public interest aspects of 
institutional investment management in their corporate governance roles.  
By leaving institutions’ corporate governance roles as a merely private matter subject to 
best practices in soft law like the Stewardship Code,  policy-makers are able to ‘de-socialise’ 
the problem of corporate scandals and savers’ investment expectations, framing them as 
‘market failures’ or ‘market outworkings’. We, therefore, contend that the public interest in 
investment management, its outworking for savers and impact on the corporate sector are 
issues that require public policy and we make a case for regulating institutions’ shareholder 
roles under securities and investment management regulation. We argue that such regulation 
is able to introduce standardisation of certain expectations of conduct and best practices in 
order to re-orient investment management towards serving the public interest and to 
overcome current governance and accountability deficits. Steps are needed to govern those 
responsible for investment management in order to meet the public interest expectations of 
delivering long-term savings for investors and maintaining a sustainably wealth creating 
corporate sector for the future. 
 
 
 
